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ABSTRACT
This Paper investigates the conseouences of fiscal policies for the
exchange rate. After deveiopin a simple theory of how government
financing policies should effect the exchange rate, we test it using data
on the dollar/pound exchanoe rate. Previous analyses have concentrated
mainly on the post—Bretton Woods flexible exchange rate system, thus
ignoring potentially useful information contained in fixed exchange rate
periods or in previous flexible exchange rate periods. Thispaper shows
that it is theoretically proper and econometrically feasible tomerge
evidence from different nominal exchange rate systems. The gainot this
procedure is that we can extend the sample period back to the i870s. Our
results suggest that permanent government expenditures are the only fiscal
variables that significantly affected the dollaripound nominal exchange
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1. Introduction
That there exists a strong relationship between government policies and
the nominal exchange rate has long been recognized.Monetary policies, in
particular, have been the object of several theoretical and empirical attempts
to explain exchange rate movements during periods of flexible exchange rate
regimes. More recently, considerable effort has been devoted to the
understanding of exchange rate discontinuities caused by the collapse of fixed
exchange rate regimes. Most of this theoretical and empirical work has
focused on the monetary causes of these exchange rate movements.They all
stress the fundamental incompatibility of continuous inflationary policies
with the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate.
Even if monetary policies have been a prime subject of investigation,
little attention has been paid, either by the flexible exchange rate
literature or by the collapsing exchange rate literature, to theunderlying
determinants of monetary policies. This paper, on the other hand, explicitly
considers the rationale behind money supply decisions, by formalizing the link
between fiscal and monetary policy. Inflation, in particular, isseen as the
result of the optimal financing of an exogenous stream ofgovernment
expenditures.
By stressing the role of inflation as a financing instrument, this
analysis provides useful insights into the understanding of the evolution of
the international monetary system. At the basis of this approach is the idea
that both the dynamics of flexible exchange rates and the choice of exchange
rate regime are endogenous variables. In this paper we take the view that
government spending is the fundamental exogenous variable driving both the
exchange rate (during flexible regime periods) and the switches between the3
twoalternativeexchange rate regimes. A brief overview of the historyof the
dollar/pound exchange rate reveals, in fact, an alternationof periods of
fixed exchange rates (during times of relative tranquillity in government
spending), and periods of flexible rates (during periods of highand divergent
level of expenditure).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model in
which inflation, income taxes and deficits are the results of an optimal
government budget decision. Section 3 derives the implicationsfor exchange
rate behavior1 and estimate the model using ordinary least squares.Section 4
describes a variant of censored data techniques that can be fruitfully used in
this circumstance, and provides maximum likelihood estimates following this
approach. Section 5 concludes the paper with a summary of the results.
2. A Model of Optimal Seizniorage
In this section we describe a simple model in which the dynamics of
income taxes, seigniorage and government debt are the result of a rational
decision of the government seeking to finance a given flow of expenditure in
an optimal manner. The model is close in spirit to work on optimal inflation
tax by Phelps (1973). A similar approach is used by Mankiw (1987) to explain
the post World War II behavior of nominal interest rates in the U.S.
The intuition behind the model is quite simple. The government can use
different means of financing its expenditure: income taxes, monetization or
deficits. The government has to choose the optimal mix of these instruments.
If the problem has an interior solution, part of expenditure is going to be
financed by money creation.
Consider an economy whose representative agent is interested in4




where c is the consumption at time t, and 0 < < 1 is the discount factor.
Randomness in this economy is the consequence of stochastic government
spending and output, which will be introduced below. The agents of this
economy have access to the international credit market, where real bonds
are traded at the world given interest rate r that, for simplicity, is
postulated to be such that fi Theindividuals are assumed to hold cash
balances in order to economize on the transaction cost of exchange.
Transactions are costly in the sense that a certain fraction of individual's
real income is used up in the transaction process. This fraction, v, is a





where P is the price level andy the exogenous real income.' In addition,
agents are required to pay taxes in real terms. In order to capture in a
simple way the distortionary effects of income taxes, we assume that a
fraction of real income is absorbed n the tax collection process. The
fraction, z, is a convex function of the ratio of taxesto real income:
' A similar approach is used by Greenwood (1983) andKimbrough (1986).z' > 0
z —z(r/y)
Zn> 0
0 < z < I
Time tbudgetconstraint is given by:
c ++ vy+zy+b+ — +(l+rjb1+t1







where m are the real money balances, is the nominal interest rate which
satisfies the Fisher equation (i+Rt) —(l.it)(l+r)
and is the rate of
inflation.
In deriving problem P-i we also assume that b1 —M1
—0and that the
usual transversality condition holds.





Equation (2.1) is the well known random walk property of the marginalutility
of consumption, while (2.2) reveals that, since we assumed v" >0, increases
in inflation are costly since they reduce desired cash balancesas a fraction
of income.
The next step is to endogenize inflation by considering theoptimization
problem of a government seeking to maximize the welfare of the representative
agent in the economy. In this case the authorities will choose the paths of
inflation, taxes and deficits which minimize the cost of raising the revenue
necessary to finance their expenditures. The period t budget constraint for
the government is given by:
(Mt -Mtl + (l+r)Bi =÷Bt +
-
Makinguse of the usual transversality condition, the government optimization
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For simplicity, define seigniorageSt —].+Rm. Note that the marginal
t7
öv(t)
social cost of inflation is positive, i.e. —>0.Moreover, we require the
lrt
objective function to be convex, which implies z">O, as assumed, and
82v(t)
>0.











As(2.3) reveals, the solution of this problem involves equating the
ratios of the marginal cost to the marginal revenue of the two alternative
financing instruments (since output is exogenous, the marginal revenue of
income taxes is one in this model). The optimum must be in the positively
sloped side of the inflation tax Laffer's curve, where the marginal revenue
as
from money creation is positive, i.e. > 0. Equation (2.4) equates the
itt
ratio of marginal cost to marginal revenue of the income tax today and in the
future. Equation (2.5) does the same for the inflation tax. In the special





Since condition (2.2) implies that in equilibrium -v'(.) —, theoptimal
t
policy is to set inflation in such a way that—0.This is Friedman's
optimum quantity of money rule. In this case seigniorage will be nil, and
government expenditure will be financed only through taxes. The opposite
extreme is one in which inflationary policy is non-distortionary, i.e. v0.
In this case, as long as the marginal revenue frommoney financing is
positive, taxes will be set to zero. In the intermediate case in which both
types of financing are distortionary, we would expect that both will be used
to assure solvency.
In a recent paper, Kimbrough (1986) challenges the view that seigniorage
should be part of an optimal tax policy. He argues that, even if taxes are
distortionary, Friedman's optimal quantity of money rule should be followed.
In his model, inflation decreases the potential output of theeconomy, by
reducing the individual's time endowment (an hypothesis analogous to the one
we made above). On the other hand, he assumes that the only alternative
financing instrument is a consumption tax, which does not have the same direct
negative effect on the production possibility frontier (it alters the marginal
choice between consumption and leisure, but does not affect the total time
endowment). Because of this asymmetry, in that model it is optimal to refrain
from raising revenues through seigniorage.
In our model, instead, taxes and inflation lead to a similar contraction
of potential output, so that they are both used as financing instruments.9
Moreover,because of the deadweight losses imposed by taxes and inflationary
finance, in our environment it is optimal to usedeficits as a buffer for
temporary deviations of government expenditurefrom its permanent level.
Income taxes and inflation should be used to finance onlythe permanent part
of government expenditure, a generalization of thewell-known tax smoothing
result obtained by Barro (1979). This result can bederived explicitly, by





andthat v(t) is a quadratic function of inflation:
v—a+ air2.
12t
Then, inflation, as well as the nominal interest rateand seigniorage, is a
martingale. The same is true for the income tax rate,under the assumption
that z(t) is quadratic2. Making use of the expectation operator,and assuming
for simplicity that the relevant covariance terms are equal to zero, wecan
manipulate the government budget constraint at period t to give:
(l+r)Bi +E[)EG+0[th)
(2.6)
Byassuming that output is a random walk and usingthe inartingale properties
2SeeMankiw (1987) for a similar rosult.10
of seigniorage and income tax, (2.6) can be writtenas:
Iti+G11
L —+bir (2.7) _yt t
yt
where C (-—)Z[—)EtCt÷j.
We can interpret the left-side ratio as the expectedpermanent fraction
of output consumed by the government. As longas problem P-2 has an interior
solution, increases in this ratio imply increases in the rate of inflation,
I. Implications for Exchange Rate Behavior and Empirical Application
Consider a foreign country which is in allways analogous to the domestic
economy.3 The exchange rate and the price levels in the two countriesare
assumed to be linked by:
et_pp*-i-u (2.9)
e, are the logarithms of nominal exchange rate, domestic and foreign
price level, respectively. In accord to a considerable body ofempirical
evidence, we also assume that the deviations from purchasingpower parity are
permanent in nature, i.e.:
Here we still maintain the assumption that the real interest rate is world
determined and cannot be effected by either of the two economies.11
Ut —u1+ 1t (2.10)
where is iid. We can now express the rate of change of the exchange rate
(áe) as:
Ae — +P11 us,t + l2
+ (2.11)
where and g represent the U.S. and U.K. ratios of permanent government
expenditure to output, respectively.
We now investigate whether the effects of fiscal policy on exchange rate
predicted by the above model can be detected for the dollar/pound rate.The
data set used in this study is composed of annual observations, for the period
1870-1984. We argued above that temporary expenditure should be financed
through budget deficits. Therefore, empirically we identify the temporary
component of expenditure with the real deficit, defined as:
B B1
D — - (3.1)
t1t 1•t-1
where Bt is the amount of government bonds outstanding at time t. The
permanent component is given by the difference between theactual real
expenditure and its temporary element.4
We included in the specification not only permanent expenditures but also
In this paper we used government expenditure of the central government,
inclusive of interest payments and net of transfers The results, however, are
quite robust with respect to the choice of spending aggregate. Debt istotal
debt outside the central bank. Appendix B provides a detailed description of
the data.budget deficits as a percentage of output (d,dk). This allows us to test
whether, contrary to the above theory, they have hadany effect on the
exchange rate. We also include government receipts as apercentage of output
(r, rUk). The above model predicts that, oncewe control for permanent
spendings, government revenues should not haveany independent effect on
inflation (exchange rate). However,unexpected shifts in the relative welfare
cost of the two financing instruments (i.e. changes in thez() and v()
functions) would induce switches between income taxes andinflation, for given
permanent government expenditure (see 2.3). Under these circumstances,
increases in revenue would imply a reduction in inflationand have an
appreciative effect on the exchange rate. The estimatedexchange rate
equation had, therefore, the following form:
—.o +11g5 +12 +l3d +l4duk
+
4815rus +l6rUk+ Eit (3.2)
where Eitisassumed to be independently normally distributed.
The time series of the exchange rate for thissample is plotted in Figure
1. As it is well known, and as Figure 1evidences, periods of fixed exchange
regimes have alternated with periods of flexible rates. In table1, we report
the estimate of (3.2) obtained byusing only data corresponding to periods of
flexible exchange rates. Bothpermanent expenditures are significant and have
the expected signs. Moreover, U.S.revenues appear to have had a significant
(appreciative) effect on the dollar, indicating that shifts in therelative
cost function may have occurred in the U.S..
Even if our data set extends over 115years, the above estimate are based
12only on 25 data points. This is because, for mostof the sample, the exchange
rate was fixed, making it difficult to detect the effectsof changes in
government expenditure. In the next sectionit will be shown how to improve
our estimates by properly utilizing the informationcontained in periods of
fixed exchange rates. For the moment, however, assume that one ignoresthe
problem of the existence of periods of fixed exchange rates,and uses ordinary
least squares to estimate equation (3.2) over the whole period1870-1984. The
results of this experiment are reported in Table 2. The results are very
similar to the one obtained above. Both U.S. and U.K. permanent expenditures
have the expected sign and are significantly different from zero atleast at
the 5% level. Of the other variables, U.S. government revenues seemto have a
significant impact on the exchange rate.
4. Censored Regression Models With Unobserved Thresholds
During period of fixed exchange rates, variations in permanent
expenditure would not be reflected in exchange rate changes.This does not
imply, however, that the study of these periods cannot provide anyuseful
information about our theory. On the contrary, the type of exchange rate
system may be itself a function of the levelof government expenditure.
Periods of moderate spending (taking the conditions in the other country as
given), and therefore of moderate monetization, canbe compatible with a fixed
parity. On the other hand, continuous or substantialincreases in permanent
expenditure may undermine the viability of a fixed exchangerate system,
producing its collapse and a switch to a floating regime.For example, if we
divide the observation into two groups depending on whether they belong to
periods of fixed or flexible exchange rates, we notice that,while the U.S.
13has essentially the sameaverage level of expenditure in the two subsets (6.5%
of output during fixed and 8.1% during flexiblerates) the U.K.'s average
expenditure is considerably higher during flexible rateperiods (15.5% vs.
22.1%).
The issue of collapsing exchange rate regimes has beenextensively
analyzed by the speculative attack literature.5 The focus there isto
determine the timing and the magnitude of a devaluation(revaluation), which
is seen as the consequence of an attack on the officialreserves by rational
speculators. One of the main insights of this literature is that thecrucial
variable determining a switch from fixed to flexibleexchange rate regime is
the shadow exchange rate, i.e. the equilibriumexchange that would prevail in
the post-collapse floating regime. Assuming thatonly a dollar revaluation is
possible (as it has been the case in our sample), we can describe the
condition for the viability of a fixed exchange rateas:
>
(4.1)
i.e., the rate of growth of the shadow exchange rate(e) must be above some
mm ... . minimumlevel (e ).Bydefinition, in a £lexible exchange rate regime the
shadow and the actual rate coincide
,i.e. — If the shadow rate were
observable during the period of fixed rate, we could estimate(3.2) by using
such data. The problem is that the floating shadow isnot observable during
fixed exchange rate regimes, since is observable only if:
See, for example, Flood and Garber (1984), Blanco and Carber (1986), Crilli
(1986).
14<
Therefore, in part of the sample does not have zero mean. This implies
that the OLS estimates are both biased and inconsistent. The wayin which we
propose to estimate (3.2) is to consider
—1x1+
as a censored regression (x1t is the 7 x 1 vectorof the fiscal variables, and
is the 7 x 1 vector of parameters) where the threshold ,abovewhich
the data are censored, is itself unobservable. It is assumed, however,that
we observe the variables determining it, that is:
mm
2'2t +
where x2 is a vector of observable variables. It is useful to partition the
sample observations into three distinct groups. The first group is composed
of N1 observations referring to fixed exchange rate periods. The only
information that we have for these observations is that > i.e. (El -
> -X1.
Thesecondgroup is composed of N2 observations referring tothe periods
in which a collapse of the system and a revaluation of the exchange rate
occurred. In this case we know that a collapse occurred because ie <
that is: l -E2)
< 82x2 -
The last group is composed of N3 observations referring to the flexible
exchange rate periods. In this case we freely observe which coincides
with




l2} we can write the logarithm likelihood
l2 c2






where and 4)arethe density function and the distribution function,
respectively, of the standard normal, and a + 02 -
2012.In order to
obtain consistent estimates to use as starting values in themaximum
likelihood procedure, we used a variant of atwo-stage method described by
Maddala (1983). A description of this estimator isgiven in Appendix A.
The estimates of the parameters obtained bymaximizing (4.2) are given in
Table 3, wherex2 is composed of the lagged difference between the ratios of
permanent expenditures to output of the two countries (óg) and the fixed
parity (a).Thesemaximum likelihood estimates would seem to support the
theory of optimal financing as a partial explanation of the movements of the
Dollar/Pund exchange rate between 1870 and 1984. In fact, the twopermanent
expenditure ratios are both significant and have the expected sign. Aone






a +a three percent devaluation in the dollar. Onthe other hand, a one percent
increase in the ratio of British permanent government expenditure to output
revalues the dollar by almost one percent. U.S. revenue, on the other hand,
seem to have lost part of their explanatory power.
5. Conclusions
A novel aspect of this paper is the choice of the time period inwhich
the empirical investigation is conducted. Previous studies have mainly
concentrated on the post Bretton Woods flexible exchange rate system. Inthis
paper, we make use of econometric techniquesthat exploit information
contained in data from periods of fixed exchange rates. Thus, our empirical
analysis ranges from the 1870's to the 1980's. The studyof this extended
time period is of particular importance since major changes in the nominal
exchange rates seem to be connected with major changes in government
expenditure, like the ones occurring during war times.
The results of this paper suggest that the permanent components of public
expenditures have been a crucial factor in driving the evolutionof the
dollar/pound rate in the last hundred and fifteen years. U.S. revenuesalso
contribute to the explanation of exchange rate movements, indicating possible
changes overtime of the welfare cost of alternative financinginstruments.
Moreover, the paper provides further evidence in favor of thethesis of
irrelevance of budget deficits in the determination of nominal variables.
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20Appendix A
First we obtained consistent estimate of and o by estimating (3.2) by
OLS using only the N3 observations of flexible rates. Next, from the probit
model based on the dichotomous variable I (which takes value 1 for the N2
-
observationand 0 for the N1 observation) and a
,andfrom using the
OLS estimate of the 1s, we obtained consistent estimates for a and 82.The
other two parameters, c2 and 012, do not appear in the log likelihood
functions, so that they are not estimable by maximum likelihood. However, we
can obtain consistent estimates in the following way. Consider the N2
observations, i.e. the ones referring to a revaluation. In this sample we
know that de5 <Liem, i.e.
E1-E2x-ThX — <
3 a a
Therefore, if we run OLS on
— +E1t
we would obtain biased estimates since El is not zero mean in this sample.
However, we can control for this, by noting that:
E(E1IE3 ￿ fix) —134(fi'x)
2
a1 -a12




where u has now zero mean. From the estimate a13 we can derive a12.
Finally, using a a + a -
2a12we can derive an estimate for
a2.
22ADyendix B
This appendix provides a detailed description of the data sources. All




1.A.l Real GNP, in 1929 dollars
1870-1888 Christina Romer [1986]
1889-1908 Historical Statistics of the United States
Series F3
1909-1976 National Income and Product Accounts Table:
Table 1.22 and 1.2
1977-1984 International Financial Statistics, Series 99A.R.
1.A.2 Deflator, 1929100
1870-1975 Ratio of nominal to real income from Friedman and
Schwartz (1982), Table 4.8
1976-1984 Net National Product Deflator from Survey of
Current Business
l.A.3 Nominal GNP
1870-1888 Estimated as real GNP* Deflator
1889-1908 Historical Statistics of the United States Series
Fl
1909-1976 National Income and Product Accounts Tables
1.22 and 1.1
1977-1984 International Financial Statistics, Series 99A
1.B.United Kingdom
l..B.1 Nominal GNP
1870-1965 Capie and Webber (1985), Table 111.12
1966-1984 Annual Abstract of Statistics V.112 T.337
and V.121 Tl4.8 and V.122 T14.8
1.B.2 Deflator, 1929100
1870-1965 Capie and Webber, Table 111.12
1966-1984 Ratio of Real GNP to Nominal GNP from Annual
Abstract of Statistics, V.112 T.337,
V.121 T14.8, V.122 T14.8
1.B.3 Real GNP, in 1929 pounds
1870-1984 Calciilated as the ratio of Nominal CNP to Deflator
232. Public Finance Statistics
2.A.United States
2.A.l Federal Government Expenditure
1870-1970 Historical Statistics of the U.S.
Tables Y336, Y472
1971-1984 Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1986
Table #491
2.A.2 Federal Government Debt
1870-1970 Historical Statistics of the U.S. Table Y488
1971-1984 Statistical Abstract of the U.S. Table #491
2.B. United Kingdom
2.B.1 Central Government Expenditure
1870-1938 Mitchell and Dean
1939-1965 Mitchell and Jones
1966-1984 Annual Abstract of Statistics, V. 107 T320,
Vill T352, V122 T16.4
2.B.2 Total National Debt
1870-1939 Mitchell and Dean, T5
1940-1966 Mitchell and Jones, T3
1967-1973 Economic Trends, May 1977 P106




1870-1960 Friedman-Schwartz Table B-3
1961-1984 Reserve Money, International Financial
Statistics, Series 14
3.A.2 Official Reserves
1878-1909 National Monetary Commission, T4
1910-1913 Commercial and Financial Chronicle
1914-1941 Banking and Monetary Statistics, Vl, T160
1942-1970 Banking and Monetary Statistics, V2, Tl4.l
1971-1982 Annual Statistical Digest, various
1983-1984 Federal Reserve Bulletin, various
3.B.United Kingdom
3.B.1 Monetary Base
1870-1982 Capie and Webber
1983-1984 Bank of England Querterly Bulletin
243.B.2 Official Reserves
1870-1879 Miscellaneous Statistics of the UK, Board of
Trade
1880-1887 Bankers Magazine
1888-1909 National Monetary Commission
1910-1918 Bankers Magazine
1919-1927 League of Nations Monthly Bulletin of
Statistics
1928-1931 Banking and Monetary Statistics
1932-1939 Bankers Magazine
1946-1984 International Financial Statistics
4. Exchange Rate, Dollars per Pound
1870-1890 Commercial and Financial Chronicle
1891-1909 National Monetary Commission
1910-1953 Commercial and Financial Chronicle
1954-1984 OECD, Main Economic Indicators
25Table 1
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